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Paying Paul and Robbing No One:  
An Eminent Domain Solution for 
Underwater Mortgage Debt
Robert Hockett
In the view of many analysts, the best way to assist 
“underwater” homeowners—those who owe more on their 
mortgages than their houses are worth—is to reduce the 
principal on their home loans. Yet in the case of privately 
securitized mortgages, such write-downs are almost impossible 
to carry out, since loan modifications on the scale necessitated 
by the housing market crash would require collective action 
by a multitude of geographically dispersed security holders. 
The solution, this study suggests, is for state and municipal 
governments to use their eminent domain powers to buy up and 
restructure underwater mortgages, thereby sidestepping the need 
to coordinate action across large numbers of security holders. 
It is now more than six years since U.S. residential real estate prices peaked and 
then plunged.  Prices dropped nationally by 35 percent and still linger close to 
30 percent below peak levels. In harder-hit communities, prices are considerably 
more than 50 percent below peak.1 While cyclical fluctuations push prices up for brief 
periods, no consistent upward trend has been firmly established (Chart 1). Indeed, 
the highest post-bubble price peak prior to March 2013 came not last year or the 
year before but in July 2010, while early 2012 saw the deepest post-bubble trough 
since April 2009. Prices reached a seasonal peak in September 2012, then leveled off 
through February 2013. These fluctuations, highlighted in the moving average change 
measure in Chart 1, have been the pattern in home prices since 2009.
While home prices—and hence home equity values—have fallen and remain 
low, the fixed debt obligations that buyers had to take on to purchase homes 
under bubble conditions have not. Consequently, approximately 11 million 
homes, or slightly less than a quarter of all homes with mortgages outstanding, 
are “underwater”—meaning that the balance on the mortgage exceeds the 
current market value of the home. Of these mortgages, between 3 million and 
4 million are in default, in fore closure, or foreclosed and awaiting liquidation. 
Over 2 million more are seriously delinquent—two-to-four payments in arrears 
(Olick 2012; Goodman et al. 2012; Ritholtz 2012; Goodman 2012).
1 Data are from CoreLogic, available at http://www.corelogic.com/, and from OCC Mortgage Metrics, 
available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/publications/publications-by-type/other-publications-reports/
index-mortgage-metrics.html. 
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Recognizing that defaults and foreclosures take a toll on the 
economic welfare of communities and the nation as a whole, 
many analysts have called for the write-down of principal on 
mortgage debt as the most effective solution to the problem of 
underwater mortgages. As these analysts attest, write-downs 
have the important advantage of raising value.
However, the difficulty lies in carrying out the write-downs. 
While principal reduction on mortgages held in bank portfolios 
occurs at significant and still growing rates, loans held in 
private-label securitization (PLS) trusts have certain structural 
features that make such reductions very rare. Specifically, these 
loans are subject to pooling and servicing agreements that 
would require collective action by a large majority of security 
holders before the loans could be modified or sold out of trusts. 
Conducting such a collective action across most holders of the 
securitized loans would be nearly impossible.
This edition of Current Issues puts forward a strategy for 
carrying out the write-downs. Essentially, it recommends that 
state and municipal governments use their eminent domain 
powers to address the collective action problems that now 
prevent the write-down of privately securitized loans. Under 
eminent domain, these governments can step in to purchase 
underwater loans at fair value, deal directly with the trustees 
of the private-label securitization trusts, and sidestep the 
rigidities of the pooling and servicing agreements. They can 
then reduce the principal on these loans, lowering the “water” 
and thereby reducing the risk of default.
The Mortgage Debt Overhang: Scope of the Problem
Fewer than half of the nation’s roughly 11 million under water 
mortgages are current, and large numbers of these mortgages 
go delinquent each month:2 Together with loans that are 
already delinquent or in default, 7.5 to 9.5 million additional 
homes are expected to go into liquidation over the next several 
years absent remedial action.3 These liquidations would further 
burden an already depressed market, yielding a backlog of 
vacant homes equal to 200 percent of U.S. annual home sales 
at the current sales pace (Olick 2012; Goodman et al. 2012; 
Ritholtz 2012; Goodman 2012).
For communities, the fallout from these developments is 
substantial, with residents forced to give up their homes and 
property tax bases weakened—ironically, just as abatement 
costs wrought by abandoned properties rise (Hockett 2012a). 
Other homeowners lose neighbors and endure the blight and 
lost value associated with boarded-up neighboring homes. 
Over time, they may see city services cut, school districts 
retrenching, and local economies shrinking—an aggregate 
monetized loss now estimated at $2 trillion (Hockett 2012a; 
Shoen 2012). Though causality is doubtless complex, the fact 
that so many counties have been filing for bankruptcy of late 
seems unsurprising against this backdrop (Church et al. 2012).
The mortgage debt overhang undermines the health of the 
national economy as well. Defaults and foreclosures in the 
housing markets feed back into the macroeconomy through 
effects upon net worth and spending (Federal Reserve Board 
2012; Dudley 2012). And as reduced spending lowers growth 
and employment, more mortgages are drawn into foreclosure 
(Federal Reserve Board 2012; Dudley 2012; Hockett 2012a, 
2012b). Hence the familiar “holding pattern” of high under-
water loan and foreclosure rates yielding low growth and 
employment, which in turn yield yet more default and fore-
closure, and so on (Hockett 2012a, 2012b, 2013).4
The Prudent Solution: Scaled Principal Write-Downs
The most effective means of averting mortgage delinquency, 
default, and foreclosure—and the associated economic 
costs—is principal reduction. As even creditors recognize, 
2 See Olick 2012, Goodman et al. 2012, Ritholtz 2012, and Goodman 2012, 
as well as the latest data from CoreLogic and OCC Mortgage Metrics, cited 
in note 1 above. 
3 See, for example, Fannie Mae 2012 Form 10-Q data, p. 111, available at 
http://www.fanniemae.com/resources/file/ir/pdf/quarterly-annual-results/ 
2012/q22012.pdf. See also Olick 2012; Goodman et al. 2012; Ritholtz 2012; 
Goodman 2012.
4 Of course not all mortgage troubles are attributable to declining home values. 
Some homeowners face difficulty keeping current on payments for reasons of 
temporary unemployment in a slack economy. For this class of mortgagor, several 
colleagues at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and I have designed a Home 
Mortgage Bridge Loan Assistance Program, informed by a successful Pennsylvania 
program developed during the early 1980s steel slump (Orr et al. 2011). A draft 
bill to institute the program, which two of us coauthored, is under consideration in 
New York (Campbell and Hockett 2012a, 2012c). But even assuming success here 
and in other states, the nation’s larger mortgage debt overhang problem will remain 
unaddressed (Campbell and Hockett 2012a, 2012b).
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debt loss must be formally recognized in a manner that bears 
some intelligible relation to home equity loss. Moreover, for 
much underwater mortgage debt, write-downs raise value—a 
benefit borne out by the frequency with which portfolio loan 
holders write down debt (Olick 2012; Goodman et al. 2012; 
Ritholtz 2012; Goodman 2012).
Write-downs are not easily carried out in all cases, however. 
Much depends on whether the targeted loans are held in bank 
portfolios or by private-label securitization trusts. In the port-
folio case, write-downs occur at significant and still growing 
rates (Goodman et al. 2012; Goodman 2012; Streitfeld 2011). 
Bank officers know that underwater loans foreclose at high 
rates, with the result that expected values fall needlessly short 
of face values; hence, they find it financially rational to write 
down these loans. In so doing, they benefit not only them-
selves, but also their debtors and the communities in which 
they reside. In this case, the interests of all parties converge.
Securitized mortgage loans, however, pose a problem. 
While it would be no less rational or beneficial to write these 
loans down, certain structural features of the loans—features 
that now act as market failures—prevent the rational thing 
from being done. The upshot is deadweight loss—loss whose 
recoupment and equitable distribution is one object of the 
plan sketched below.
Structural Impediments to Write-Downs
What are these structural impediments? A host of classic 
collective action problems, reinforced by dysfunctional 
contract provisions, stand in the way of the optimal solution 
(Hockett 2012a, 2012b; Shiller 2012). For one thing, there is 
a last-mover advantage where write-downs are concerned, 
owing to the benefits (positive externalities) that accrue to 
the creditors on later loans when principal is reduced on 
earlier loans. This problem afflicts portfolio loans too, of 
course, and probably therefore keeps modification rates lower 
than optimal even among banks. But in the case of privately 
securitized loans, it is reinforced by additional challenges.
Most decisive among the additional challenges is that so 
many of the pooling and servicing agreements governing the 
private securitization of loans—agreements drafted during the 
bubble years when few foresaw a marketwide housing price bust, 
and many rushed either to push or to purchase an innovative 
product—require supermajority voting among mortgage-backed 
securities (MBS) holders before loans can be modified or sold 
out of trusts. And these bondholders, geographically dispersed 
and unknown to one another, cannot collectively bargain with 
borrowers or buyers on workouts or prices.
Moreover, the agreements governing the loans prevent 
trustees and loan servicers, who are duty-bound to act on 
behalf of the bondholders and thus could in theory address 
their collective action problems, from modifying or selling 
off loans in the requisite numbers (Hockett 2012a, 2012b).5 
Finally, the agreements typically stipulate compensation 
arrangements that make it more profitable for servicers to 
oversee lengthy foreclosure proceedings than to seek modifica-
tion. In sum, then, these contracts now virtually ensure that 
mortgage loans will default, harming all interested parties.
Additional complications arise from the fact that many 
underwater homes are subject to second liens that secure home 
equity lines of credit or closed-end second mortgages. First 
lienholders benefit little from loan modifications unless second 
lienholders modify too; hence, they are rationally reluctant to 
modify on their own. But second lienholders feel less pressure 
to modify because borrowers, strapped by post-bust liquidity 
needs for which home equity lines constitute precious sources 
of credit, are apt to make payments on them first—a reversal 
of the legal order of creditor priorities (Goodman 2012).6 In 
addition, the second lienholders quite often are banks—the 
same banks that service the first-lien-secured loans. That 
poses a conflict of interest where firsts prefer that seconds 
modify too in order to optimize the benefits that modifica-
tion brings to firsts, further obstructing agreement among 
borrowers and creditors.
Other constraints—including inapplicable bankruptcy 
laws and Internal Revenue Code and Trust Indenture Act 
uncertainties—impede the kind of collective action that would 
benefit both debtors and creditors (Hockett 2012a, 2012b). But 
the foregoing discussion suffices to indicate how formidable 
the obstacles to principal write-downs can be, particularly for 
loans held in private-label securitization trusts.
Bypassing the Impediments through Collective Agency
Solving a collective action problem requires a collective agent. 
Of course, that is what PLS trustees and servicers in theory are. 
But as we have seen, these agents are often hand-tied or con-
flicted. Who, then, will act for the creditors and, in so doing, 
for homeowners and spillover victims of local foreclosure and 
the continuing weakness in the U.S. mortgage market?
As it happens, governments are also collective agents. They 
are likewise the sole entities authorized to sidestep the contract 
rigidities of the pooling and servicing agreements that stand in 
the way of broad write-downs for PLS loans. But which govern-
ment should take up this mantle—federal, state, or local?
5 In some cases, for example, pooling and servicing agreements allow no more 
than 5 percent of the loans in the pool to be modified. This percentage, which 
shows how little the marketwide crash was expected, has long since been 
reached in the case of most loan pools. 
6 Lee, Mayer, and Tracy (2012) offer a contrary view, finding that by the time a 
borrower goes delinquent on the first lien, there is little credit available on the 
home equity line. 
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In 2008-09, this author and two others separately advocated 
federal action under eminent domain—the power of govern-
ments to take private property for public use (Hockett 2009; 
Jackson 2008; Willis 2008). In 2010, two higher-profile 
advocates, including one member of Congress, added their 
names to the call (Miller 2010; Kuttner 2010). But thus far no 
action of this sort has been taken, even though other actions 
have brought some help.
The federal government’s flagship Home Affordable Mort-
gage Program (HAMP), for example, has accomplished much, 
but it is not designed to deal with underwater or “negative 
equity” mortgages. For their part, the government-sponsored 
enterprises (GSEs) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have been 
steered clear of write-downs by their regulator and current 
conservator, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (Appelbaum 
2012). Finally, Congress has twice now attempted but failed to 
get mortgaged homes into the Bankruptcy Code, thus leaving 
no means for bankruptcy judges to employ their equitable 
powers to salvage value among mortgagors and mortgagees 
as they routinely do among other debtors and creditors.7
The consequences of our failure thus far to focus on 
principal reduction can be seen in more numbers: Since 2007, 
little more than 1 percent of underwater home loans have seen 
write-downs. Fewer than half of these write-downs have 
brought loans above water. Meanwhile, only 2.7 million loans 
have been modified in any way by their servicers, while 40 per-
cent of these modifications have reduced monthly payments by 
less than 10 percent.8
This weak response is surprising in light of the abundant 
evidence, derived from the portfolio loan case, that sizable 
write-downs save sizable value (Olick 2012; Goodman et al. 
2012; Ritholtz 2012; Goodman 2012). And it is surprising 
too given the compelling evidence, found in the GSEs’ filings 
with the Securities and Exchange Commission, that unmodi-
fied underwater PLS loans will default at high rates: For 2006 
vintage loans, for example, 71 percent of subprimes, 70 percent 
of option adjustable-rate mortgages, 58 percent of variable-
rate loans, and a surprising 40 percent of traditional fixed-rate 
loans have defaulted.9
The State/Municipal Eminent Domain Plan
If it is not to be federal instrumentalities or PLS trustees and 
servicers, then, the collective agents best able to address the 
structural problems that arise with the pooling and servicing 
7 For more on the 2009 and 2010 efforts to pass mortgage “cramdown” 
legislation, see Hockett (2012b).
8 See the latest CoreLogic data and OCC Mortgage Metrics, cited in note 1. 
9 See Fannie Mae’s second-quarter 2012 Form 10-Q, p. 111, available at  
http://www.fanniemae.com/resources/file/ir/pdf/quarterly-annual-results/2012/
q22012.pdf, and its 2011 Form 10-K data, available at http://www.fanniemae.com/
resources/file/ir/pdf/quarterly-annual-results/2011/10k_2011.pdf. 
agreements on privately securitized loans are state and 
municipal governments. These governments (a) face the brunt 
of mass foreclosure and its consequences more directly than 
the federal government in any event, and (b) have consti-
tutional authority to address these exigencies.10 Let us first 
consider how the subfederal units of government can act, then 
elaborate briefly on their suitability for these roles.
Using their traditional eminent domain powers—a legal 
authority enshrined in our state and federal constitutions 
for precisely such exigencies as the foreclosure crisis 
presents—states or their sub-units can compulsorily purchase 
underwater loans from private-label securitization trusts at 
fair value, dealing directly with trustees and sidestepping 
all contract rigidities. They can then write down the 
loans, reducing default risk and raising expected values 
in the process.
If need be, eminent domain authority can also be used 
to take second-lien-secured loans at fair value, or even 
the liens that secure them, while leaving the notes with 
their holders—effectively converting the latter to unsecured 
consumer debt. That prospect can bring recalcitrant 
second lienholders to the table with firsts—particularly if, 
as suggested below, they also are offered some fraction of 
the surplus recouped through the write-downs.
Financing the Refinancing: Federal Money,  
Private Money, or Both
But how are states or their sub-units to pay for the loans or 
the liens, given that the foreclosure crisis has left them more 
cash-strapped than the federal government? Here is how: 
One possibility is to finance the purchases with monies lent 
by federal agencies in the manner of the Treasury’s Troubled 
Asset Relief and Public-Private Investment Programs, and 
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s MBS stabiliza-
tion programs, all of which ultimately have turned profits. 
Alternatively, they might use monies provided by private inves-
tors, or monies from both federal agencies and private sources. 
The federal agencies or private investors then can be paid from 
the proceeds of the refinanced and accordingly more valuable 
loans, or in bonds issued against pools of the same.
If private money is used, then the investors both can and 
ought to include current bondholders, who might receive 
warrants before federal or private investors are brought in. 
This approach respects bondholder interests and underscores 
the sense in which the eminent domain plan is meant simply 
to solve a collective action problem that dysfunctional pooling 
and servicing agreements prevent trustees and servicers from 
solving themselves on behalf of their bondholder beneficiaries.
10 Note, however, that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac themselves hold 
significant numbers of underwater loans in their portfolios. 
 www.newyorkfed.org/research/current_issues  5
By working with states or municipalities in this manner, 
current bondholders would piggyback on governmental 
authority to sidestep the contracts that currently preclude 
their doing what portfolio lenders already do. To note that 
these participating bondholders will be “paying themselves” 
less than face value would just be a roundabout way of saying 
that they are writing down principal.
The diagram above presents a schematic rendering of 
the eminent domain plan. The diagram, which should be 
read counterclockwise, shows investors, including current 
bondholders and perhaps federal agencies, conveying funds 
to eminent domain trusts operated by the states or their sub-
units. These eminent domain trusts then purchase deeply 
underwater (“bad”) loans from private-label securitization 
trusts. The states or their sub-units, in most cases probably 
advised or otherwise assisted by financial professionals, then 
work with homeowners to write new mortgages, replacing 
the negative equity loans with modestly positive equity 
loans—probably thirty-year fixed-rate mortgages in all 
cases.11 Finally, the new (“good”) loans are conveyed to the 
first-mentioned trusts, which convey the resultant funds to 
the first-mentioned investors.
The payouts will in most cases take the form that payouts on 
the earlier, unmodified loans took—bond yields to bondholders. 
And, as noted earlier, the new bondholders should include as 
many of the original bondholders as wish to participate, since 
11 Freeing the loans from their PLS trusts, it bears noting, renders them 
amenable to the Federal Housing Administration Short Refinance, Hardest 
Hit Funds, and HAMP Principal Reduction Alternative programs. 
the aim of the plan is to enable homeowners and bondholders 
to do what the pooling and servicing agreements now prevent 
them from doing—modifying underwater loans to recoup 
presently lost value.
The sequence of steps depicted in the diagram provides 
only the broad outline of the plan. More is required to 
render any particular variation operational. There are, for 
example, the matters of (a) selecting and valuing appropriate 
loans; (b) securing government and/or private investors, 
if any; (c) commencing the legal proceedings necessary 
to exercise eminent domain authority; (d) modifying 
and possibly re-securitizing the loans once purchased; 
(e) working with homeowners throughout the foregoing; 
and (f) compensating investors at appropriate stages.
All of these actions can be managed in various ways 
(Hockett 2012a). Briefly, on (a), the guiding criterion should 
be whether the loans’ expected value can be raised sufficiently 
to offset the write-downs and associated transaction costs. 
A variation on this criterion, where public money is available 
to supplement private money, might be to include loans whose 
expected-value improvements fall slightly short of offsetting 
the write-downs and associated transaction costs, in light of 
the foreclosure externalities that write-downs will avoid.
On (b), if federal and subfederal units of government find 
merit in the plan, they can approach one another to arrange 
lending from the former to the latter. Either can also approach 
existing bondholders or other investors if desired.
On (c), states or their sub-units will commence the pro-
ceedings and courts will conduct them. In the “quick take” 
proceedings available in most states, the taking authority 
places the estimated value of the loans plus some margin in 
escrow when filing, explains the basis of its valuations to the 
court’s satisfaction, then takes title. Subsequent litigation, if 
any, concerns only whether more should be paid, not whether 
the taking can proceed. In most cases, governments have 
accurately assessed the value of the loan, often with assistance 
from private valuation experts, and paid adequately. This bears 
noting in view of popular misconceptions concerning the 
likelihood of protracted litigation.
It should also be noted that, in view of the market failure 
and consequent waste stories that prompt this proposal, we 
can anticipate sizable pre-trial, out-of-court agreements among 
state or municipal governments and bondholders on loan 
selection and valuation criteria, particularly if relevant federal 
officials facilitate.
As for (d), (e), and (f), these are primarily matters for 
states or municipalities to manage, albeit again with assis-
tance from public or private financial professionals in most 
cases. The municipalities are best situated to approach 
Investors:
private and/or
public
Current MBS
holders
Eminent
domain 
trust
States/
sub-units
Homeowners
$
$ $
$
PLS 
trusts
Overlapping membership
Good loans Bad loans
New obligation New lending
$
Basic Structure of the Eminent Domain Plan
Notes: The double-headed arrow represents class overlap rather than a flow.  The two 
vertical arrows crossing the dotted line represent a detour between the “bad loan” and 
“good loan” arrows.  MBS is mortgage-backed securities; PLS is private-label securitization.
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prospective homeowner beneficiaries once qualifying loans 
are identified. Financial advisory assistance, in turn—
whether from a federal entity like the Federal Housing 
Administration, from private providers, or both—will be 
helpful in most cases both in restructuring loans and in 
arranging investor compensation.
The Plan’s Legal Basis: Taking Intangibles for Public Purpose 
and Paying Fair Value
How commonly is eminent domain used for more than 
compulsory land purchases for roads and bridges? Though 
non-lawyers are not always aware of the fact, governmental 
authorities compulsorily purchase property at fair value for 
public use all the time (Hockett 2012a, Section IV). And they 
do so with all manner of property—tangible and intangible, 
contractual and realty-related alike.
Forms of intangible property that have been purchased 
in eminent domain include bond tax exemption covenants, 
insurance policies, corporate equities, other contract rights, 
businesses as going concerns, and even sports franchises 
(Hockett 2012a). Because the law draws no distinctions 
between kinds of property that can be purchased in eminent 
domain, it is unsurprising that loans and liens in particular, 
as one form of contractual obligation among many, are 
themselves regularly purchased.12 Among these are 
mortgage loans and liens, as the Supreme Court and state 
courts have long recognized.13
The question, then, is not what kinds of property can be 
taken, but whether a public purpose justifies the taking and 
fair value is paid. Preventing more foreclosures, blighted 
properties, revenue base losses, and city service cutbacks 
is recognized by courts as the most compelling of public 
purposes justifying use of the eminent domain authority.14 
As for fair value, how is this determined? Won’t municipalities 
have to purchase loans at less than fair value to recoup enough 
margin to compensate the investors, public or private, who 
put up the purchase money?
First, on valuation, there are multiple methods available. 
Where mortgage-backed securities associated with a particular 
loan pool or analogous pools trade at a discount, for example, 
imputation of counterpart discounts to underlying loans is 
arithmetically straightforward. And private-label securitiza-
tion bonds, it bears noting, are trading at very steep discounts. 
12 Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation, 524 U.S. 156 (1998) (accrued 
interest on account funds); Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960) 
(materialman’s lien); and the iconic Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall) 
457 (1870). See, generally, Hockett (2012a).
13 Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 602; W. Fertilizer 
& Cordage Co. v. City of Alliance, 504 N.W.2d 808, 816 (Neb. 1993). Again, see 
Hockett (2012a).
14 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
The latest data from Amherst Securities on PLS senior debt, 
for example, are telling, as are estimates of senior bonds as 
percentages of total bonds outstanding and prices thereof 
as percentages of unpaid principal balances (see table above).
Where bond-to-loan discount-imputation is unavailable 
owing to missing markets, discounted cashflow methods will 
do. As noted above, for example, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
publish expected default rates for sundry classes of under-
water PLS mortgages each year. From these—along with 
foreclosure costs, associated recovery rates (generally no more 
than 22 percent on defaulted loans), and discount rates—the 
calculation of net present values is not a recondite exercise. 
And our courts, which routinely hear valuation arguments in 
multiple contexts and often impanel experts, will oversee the 
proceedings as required by law, ensuring fairness to parties. 
Even this safeguard might be more than is necessary, however, 
if federally overseen valuation summits of the kind mentioned 
above and discussed further below should prove workable.
What about the putative need to pay current investors 
less than fair value to compensate new ones? Must one 
rob Peter to pay Paul? The answer is no. Eminent domain 
proceedings need not represent “zero sum games.” By avert-
ing market failures—and the needless sacrifice of value 
that these failures entail—the plan proposed here recoups 
value, which can then be equitably distributed to render all 
stakeholders better off.
First lienholders who help finance the purchases from their 
PLS trusts receive loans that are higher in expected value in 
exchange for loans with lower expected value. First lienholders 
who do not thus participate receive fair value for otherwise 
unmarketable assets. (This is so even if trustees in some cases 
must divide proceeds among subclasses.) Homeowners receive 
modest equity in their homes and diminished default and 
foreclosure risk. Neighbors see their communities, property 
values, and municipal services stabilized, while municipalities 
see property tax revenues restored and abatement costs drop. 
Even second lienholders can benefit if paid a small fraction of 
Senior Bond Pricing for Private Label Securitization 
Trusts: August 2012 
Price as a  
Percentage of
Senior Bond
Senior Bond
Percentage of Total
Price as a  
Percentage
of Loan UPB
Subprime 55.7 90.0 50.1
Option ARM 58.5 90.0 52.7
Alt-A ARM 66.7 90.0 60.0
Alt-A Fixed 73.1 90.0 65.8
Source: Amherst Securities. 
Notes: UPB is unpaid principal balance. ARM is adjustable-rate mortgage; 
Alt-A is Alternative-A, a risk classification between prime and subprime.
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the value recouped by the write-downs, since in foreclosure 
they receive nothing.
Why the National Problem Is First a Local Problem
It was suggested earlier that state and local governments might 
be better situated than the federal government to take the lead 
in pursuing a plan like that sketched in this article—even if 
federal instrumentalities might play helpful supporting roles. 
Why is this the case? In what sense do localities face the worst 
of the mortgage debt overhang problem, and thus have incen-
tive to act first?
The answer is that even though the problem is ultimately 
national in scope, its worst symptoms are locally concentrated. 
In some communities, more than 80 percent of PLS loans are 
underwater. The degree to which the loans are underwater, 
moreover, can be dramatic: some communities’ underwater 
PLS loans have average loan-to-value (LTV) ratios greater 
than 200 percent, and many more have ratios approaching 
that number. The map above affords a telling, if understated,15 
picture of how localized the worst of the nation’s underwater 
mortgage problems actually are.16 
Concerns Raised by the Eminent Domain Plan
While it is not possible here to anticipate and fully address 
all concerns that the eminent domain plan might invite, 
one can cover the most obvious ones in broad outline. 
These fall under two headings—concerns of the sort that 
debt write-downs seem always to raise, and concerns 
relating to the reliance on state rather than federal 
authority to implement the plan.
15 The chart covers all underwater loans, and does not distinguish high-LTV 
loans from lower-LTV loans. 
16 CoreLogic Negative Equity Report, Fourth-Quarter 2012, available at  
http://www.corelogic.com/. 
Source: CoreLogic Negative Equity Report.
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Debates over the justice and efficiency of debt forgiveness 
are long-standing. Critics say that contracts are binding 
commitments that must be upheld, while proponents of debt 
forgiveness say some debts are “odious.” Again, critics say 
that write-downs induce moral hazard and reduce credit 
availability, while proponents observe that you cannot 
squeeze blood from turnips. We are not going to settle 
such perennial questions here, any more than the Book of 
Leviticus or centuries of “law versus equity” have done. But 
three things bear noting.
First, owing to asset-price bubbles’ status as collective 
action problems, it is doubtful that many homebuyers during 
the bubble years had much choice when it came to buying 
overvalued homes. That most homes were overvalued is what 
rendered the bubble a bubble. It therefore seems mistaken 
to blame homeowners as a class, or to characterize write-
downs as per se unfair or morally hazardous. It is also easy to 
formulate loan-selection criteria in ways that do not encourage 
“strategic” defaults going forward—by reference to LTV/default 
correlations as suggested above (Hockett 2012a, 2013, 2010).
Second, for similar reasons, there seems little need to 
fear long-term contraction in liquidity or credit. Bubbles 
inflate only when credit is overabundant. We want, then, 
some credit-caution in future, just not too much. And we 
want to get to that middle ground as quickly as possible. The 
best way to do this is first to clear out the overhang under 
which 11 million homeowners still struggle, then to ensure 
that the pooling and servicing agreements for residential 
mortgage-backed securities going forward look more like 
the agreements for commercial mortgage-backed securities 
always have looked—providing in advance for value-salvaging 
modifications on a scale unanticipated before the most recent 
crisis, and thereby preempting the future need to resort to 
such methods as the one proposed here.17 New residential 
mortgage securitizations suggest that the latter change is 
already under way. To resolve what earlier securitizations have 
wrought, however, requires a plan like that outlined above.
Finally, it is important to recall that write-downs are done 
on nonmortgage debt all the time. We call it bankruptcy, and 
afford it to firms because it salvages value. The plan proposed 
here does the same. And as noted above, the value thus saved 
can be shared among all stakeholder classes.
Turning now to issues linked to the plan’s reliance on 
state, rather than federal, authority, we find some concerns 
stemming from possible differential application of the 
eminent domain plan across states and localities. Florida 
counties, for example, might construct variants of the 
plan that differ from those adopted by Louisiana parishes. 
California or Michigan plans might diverge from both. Would 
such differences raise fairness concerns?
17 For more on the differences between RMBS and CMBS pooling and 
servicing agreements, see Hockett (2012b).
The question is a complex one. We should certainly 
welcome some degree of national uniformity (this is one 
reason the present author [2009] first proposed federal, 
not state or local, action in 2008). But local conditions 
do vary from county to county, such that fairness itself 
dictates some variation. It is also the case that our federal 
system already involves quite significant state variation 
with respect to all manner of law—from property, tort, and 
even commercial law to electoral law. There will be nothing 
particularly unusual, then, in differing states’ crafting 
differing variants of the plan here proposed. It might even 
be welcome—for the usual “laboratories of democracy” 
reasons given for local experimentation.
All of that said, however, federal agencies could be helpful 
in confining local variation within reasonable bounds, as 
well as in promoting efficient and amicable loan workouts 
nationwide along lines like those here proposed. By bring-
ing municipal or state, homeowner, bondholder, and bank 
representatives together under one “summit” structure, the 
Treasury, Federal Housing Finance Agency, Federal Reserve 
Board or regional banks like the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York operating thereunder, the Department of Hous-
ing and Urban Development, or some combination thereof 
could facilitate consensus among all concerned parties on the 
basic contours that all local variants of the eminent domain 
plan should take. There is no reason this consensus could not 
include loan-selection and loan-valuation principles as well as 
more detailed practical elements.
Conclusion: It Takes a Village—but a Federal 
Government Helps
The guiding ideal in any such summit as that proposed 
here should be to convert the eminent domain tool into a 
mere formality enabling all interested parties to sidestep 
dys functional pooling and servicing agreements consensually 
and thereby recapture lost value. Getting past these contracts 
and the collective action problems they underwrite is, after 
all, precisely and solely what this plan is for. States and their 
sub-units are best situated at this point to act. But federal 
agencies could be helpful facilitators for all.
The author thanks Kaushik Basu, Michael Campbell, 
Thomas Deutsch, Laurie Goodman, Howell Jackson, 
Darius Kingsley, Christopher Mayer, Brad Miller, Lawrence 
Rufrano, Robert Shiller, Joseph Tracy, Lauren Willis, and 
other colleagues at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 
the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Deposit Insurance 
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The Financial Crisis at the Kitchen Table: Trends in 
Household Debt and Credit
Meta Brown, Andrew Haughwout, Donghoon Lee,  
and Wilbert van der Klaauw
Current Issues in Economics and Finance, vol. 19, no. 2, 2013
Since the onset of the financial crisis, households have reduced 
their outstanding debt by about $1.3 trillion. While part of 
this reduction stemmed from a historic increase in consumer 
defaults and lender charge-offs, particularly on mortgage 
debt, other factors were also at play. An analysis of the New York 
Fed’s Consumer Credit Panel—a rich new data set on individual 
credit accounts—reveals that households actively reduced their 
obligations during this period by paying down their current 
debts and reducing new borrowing. These household choices, 
along with banks’ stricter lending standards, helped drive this 
deleveraging process.
Securitization and the Fixed-Rate Mortgage
Andreas Fuster and James Vickery
Staff Reports, no. 594, January 2013
Fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs) dominate the U.S. mortgage 
market, with important consequences for household risk 
management, monetary policy, and systemic risk. This study 
shows that securitization is a key driver of FRM supply. The 
analysis compares the agency and nonagency mortgage-
backed-securities (MBS) markets, exploiting the freeze in 
nonagency MBS liquidity in the third quarter of 2007. Using 
exogenous variation in access to the agency MBS market, 
the authors find that when both market segments are liquid, 
they perform similarly in terms of supporting FRM supply. 
However, after the nonagency market freezes, the share 
of FRMs is sharply higher among mortgages eligible to be 
securitized through the still-liquid agency MBS market. The 
authors conclude that securitization is particularly important 
for FRMs because of the prepayment and interest rate risk 
embedded in these loans. They highlight policy implications 
for ongoing reform of the U.S. mortgage finance system.
Payment Size, Negative Equity, and Mortgage Default
Andreas Fuster and Paul S. Willen
Staff Reports, no. 582, November 2012
Surprisingly little is known about the importance of mortgage 
payment size for default, as efforts to measure the treatment 
effect of rate increases or loan modifications are confounded 
by borrower selection. This study examines a sample of hybrid 
adjustable-rate mortgages that have experienced large rate 
reductions over the past years and are largely immune to these 
selection concerns. The authors show that interest rate changes 
dramatically affect repayment behavior. Their estimates imply 
that cutting a borrower’s payment in half reduces his hazard 
of becoming delinquent by about two-thirds, an effect that is 
approximately equivalent to lowering the borrower’s combined 
loan-to-value ratio from 145 to 95 (holding the payment fixed). 
These findings shed light on the driving forces behind default 
behavior and have important implications for public policy.
A New Look at Second Liens
Donghoon Lee, Christopher Mayer, and Joseph Tracy
Staff Reports, no. 569, August 2012
The authors use data from credit reports and deed records to 
better understand the extent to which second liens contributed 
to the housing crisis by allowing buyers to purchase homes 
with small down payments. At the top of the housing market, 
second liens were quite prevalent: As many as 45 percent 
of home purchases in coastal markets and bubble locations 
involved a piggyback second lien. Owner-occupants were 
more likely to use piggyback second liens than were investors. 
Second liens in the form of home equity lines of credit 
(HELOCs) were originated to relatively high-quality borrowers, 
and originations were declining near the peak of the housing 
boom. By contrast, characteristics of closed-end second liens 
(CES) were worse on all these dimensions. The default rate of 
the second lien is generally similar to that of the first lien on 
the same home, although HELOCs perform better than CES. 
About 20 to 30 percent of borrowers will continue to pay their 
second lien for more than a year while remaining seriously 
delinquent on their first mortgage. By comparison, about 
40 percent of credit card borrowers and 70 percent of auto 
loan borrowers will continue making payments a year after 
defaulting on their first mortgage. Finally, the authors show 
that delinquency rates on second liens, especially HELOCs, 
have not declined as quickly as those on most other types 
of credit, raising a potential concern for lenders with large 
portfolios of second liens on their balance sheets.
Payment Changes and Default Risk: The Impact of 
Refinancing on Expected Credit Losses
Joseph Tracy and Joshua Wright
Staff Reports, no. 562, June 2012
This paper analyzes the relationship between changes in 
borrowers’ monthly mortgage payments and future credit 
performance. The relationship is important for the design of 
an internal refinance program such as the Home Affordable 
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Refinance Program (HARP). The authors use a competing risk 
model to estimate the sensitivity of default risk to downward 
adjustments of borrowers’ monthly mortgage payments for 
a large sample of prime adjustable-rate mortgages. Applying 
a 26 percent average monthly payment reduction that they 
estimate would result from refinancing under HARP, the 
authors find that the cumulative five-year default rate on prime 
conforming adjustable-rate mortgages with loan-to-value ratios 
above 80 percent declines by 3.8 percentage points. Assuming 
an average loss given default of 35.2 percent, the authors 
determine that this lower default risk implies reduced credit 
losses of 134 basis points per dollar of balance for mortgages that 
refinance under HARP.
Real Estate Investors, the Leverage Cycle, and  
the Housing Market Crisis
Andrew Haughwout, Donghoon Lee, Joseph Tracy,  
and Wilbert van der Klaauw
Staff Reports, no. 514, September 2011
This study explores a mostly undocumented but important 
dimension of the housing market crisis: the role played by 
real estate investors. Using unique credit-report data, the 
authors document large increases in the share of purchases, 
and subsequently delinquencies, by real estate investors. 
In states that experienced the largest housing booms and 
busts, at the peak of the market almost half of purchase 
mortgage originations were associated with investors. In part 
by apparently misreporting their intentions to occupy the 
property, investors took on more leverage, contributing to 
higher rates of default. The authors’ findings have important 
implications for policies designed to address the consequences 
and recurrence of housing market bubbles.
Help for Unemployed Borrowers: Lessons from the 
Pennsylvania Homeowners’ Emergency Mortgage 
Assistance Program
James Orr, John Sporn, Joseph Tracy, and Junfeng Huang
Current Issues in Economics and Finance, vol. 17, no. 2,  
April 2011
In an environment of high foreclosure rates and distressed 
housing markets, federal policies are focusing on loan 
modifications to help delinquent homeowners pay their 
mortgages. While it is too soon to assess the effectiveness 
of these modifications, policymakers considering future 
refinements may gain insight from a more established, state-
level enterprise that takes an alternative approach to mortgage 
relief. The Pennsylvania Homeowners’ Emergency Mortgage 
Assistance Program provides temporary income support to 
homeowners unable to pay their mortgage during a spell of 
unemployment. The program has helped most participants 
retain their homes while paying off their loans—at a 
potentially lower cost than that of other relief initiatives.
A Private Lender Cooperative Model for Residential 
Mortgage Finance
Toni Dechario, Patricia Mosser, Joseph Tracy, James Vickery, 
and Joshua Wright
Staff Reports, no. 466, August 2010
This paper describes a set of six design principles for the 
reorganization of the U.S. housing finance system and applies 
them to one model for replacing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
that has so far received frequent mention but little sustained 
analysis—the lender cooperative utility. The authors discuss 
the pros and cons of such a model and propose a method 
for organizing participation in a mutual loss pool and an 
explicit, priced government insurance mechanism. They also 
discuss how these principles and this model are consistent 
with preserving the “to-be-announced,” or TBA, market—
particularly if the fixed-rate mortgage remains a focus of 
public policy.
Second Chances: Subprime Mortgage Modification  
and Re-Default
Andrew Haughwout, Ebiere Okah, and Joseph Tracy
Staff Reports, no. 417, December 2009, revised August 2010
Mortgage modifications have become an important component 
of public interventions designed to reduce foreclosures. This 
study examines how the structure of a mortgage modification 
affects the likelihood of the modified mortgage re-defaulting 
over the next year. Using data on subprime modifications 
that precede the government’s Home Affordable Modification 
Program, the authors focus attention on those modifications 
in which the borrower was seriously delinquent and the 
monthly payment was reduced as part of the modification. 
The average re-default rate over the twelve months following 
the modification was 56 percent. The data indicate that the 
re-default rate declines with the magnitude of the reduction in 
the monthly payment, but also that the re-default rate declines 
relatively more when the payment reduction is achieved 
through principal forgiveness as opposed to lower interest rates.
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Available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/householdcredit/
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s Household Debt and 
Credit Report provides a quarterly snapshot of household 
trends in borrowing and indebtedness, including data about 
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to better understand, monitor, and respond to trends in 
borrowing and indebtedness at the household level.
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